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Introduction
A key factor in maintaining the peace and security of Northeast Asia is the 
stability of the China-Taiwan relationship.  At this point in time relations 
between Mainland China and Taiwan have become relatively cordial.  This 
rapprochement between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits is a welcome 
development in the United States and the other nations in the region. 
There is the fact that China has been continuing to modernize its People’s 
Liberation Army in order to enhance its power-projection capabilities and 
a rehearsal for a possible invasion of Taiwan if it were to declare formal 
or de jure independence from Mainland China.  Nevertheless, although 
the two sides are vastly different societies in terms of political structure, 
trade, investment, and people-to-people exchanges have been expanding at 
a steady pace since the easing of tensions in the 1980s with Taiwan lifting 
martial law in 1987.  As well, the current leadership in Taiwan is committed 
to improving relations with Mainland China while maintaining Taiwan’s 
democratic principles.  This new era of rapprochement can only be viewed 
as a positive step in the right direction for regional peace and prosperity.
The Status of Taiwan: Historical Background
The first inhabitants of Taiwan were people believed to be of Malay-
Polynesian origin.  They came before the 1600s and referred to present day 
Taiwan as Pakan.  In the 17th Century, around 1590, a Dutch navigator on a 
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Portuguese ship, Jan Huygen van Linschoten, called Taiwan, "lIha Formosa" 
in Portuguese for "Beautiful Island," reflecting the natural environment 
that he saw while exploring the area.  The Dutch established a post in the 
southwestern area of the island and named it "Zeelandia."  The area where 
they established this fortress was called Tayouan, which means terrace bay, 
and later was to be the name for the whole island before being called by 
its present name, Taiwan.  The Dutch were eventually driven off Taiwan 
in 1662 by a Chinese pirate, Cheng Cheng-kung (Koxinga).  From the 1660s 
through the 1680s, the Manchus from China defeated the Koxingans and 
took control of the western part of the island in 1683.  This region was then 
annexed to the Chinese Empire.1  In August of 1884, under the command 
of Admiral Coubert, French naval forces invaded and occupied northern 
Taiwan, but were unsuccessful in acquiring the whole island.  Just as the 
British had set up an enclave in Hong Kong, Coubert wanted to turn the 
Pescadores (Penghu Islands) into a similar type of trading colony.  He died 
of a tropical disease in June 1885, and subsequently French ambitions in 
Taiwan came to an end.  On April 17, 1895, the Sino-Japanese War ended 
and Taiwan was ceded to Japan with the signing of the Shimonoseki Treaty 
by Li Hung-chang from China and his Japanese counterpart, Ito Hirobumi.
  
The people in Taiwan established the Formosan Republic in order to resist 
Japanese colonial rule on May 25, 1895.  These founders of the Republic were 
ultimately unsuccessful as the Japanese did not leave the island until they 
were expelled after Japan’s defeat in World War II in August 1945.  Upon 
being returned back to China's Nationalist Forces, Taiwan experienced an 
economic slowdown and high unemployment.  The corruption and heavy 
handedness of the early Nationalist regime lead to the "2-28 Incident" on 
February 28, 1947.  This occurred when authorities from the Monopoly 
Bureau assaulted a woman whom they believed to be selling cigarettes 
illegally.  A man was shot trying to aid the woman and unrest ensued until 
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the Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek brutally put down the revolt 
resulting in over 20,000 innocent people being killed.2 
In December 1949, upon being defeated by Mao Zedong's communist forces 
on Mainland China, Chiang Kai-shek and over one million of his Nationalist 
compatriots fled to Taiwan, hoping to return one day and “recover” the 
Mainland.  After this occurrence, the United States and the United Nations 
refused to give the PRC diplomatic recognition and still recognized the ROC 
as the legitimate government of China.  However, U.S. aid to Taiwan was 
cut until a change in U.S. policy towards the island after the communists 
in North Korea launched a full-scale invasion of South Korea on June 25, 
1950.  Fearing an attack from Mainland China, President Truman sent the 
U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet into the Straits of Formosa to protect Taiwan. 
This prevented China from trying to invade Taiwan, and consequently also 
hindered the Nationalists from trying to re-take the Mainland.  Tensions 
in cross-strait relations continued unabated.  Taiwan's offshore islands of 
Quemoy and Matsu came under heavy artillery bombardment from the 
People's Liberation Army on September 3, 1951.  The U.S. got further 
involved in the area when President Dwight Eisenhower promulgated the 
Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC on December 2, 1954.
On September 15, 1971, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a 
trip to the PRC.  This trip signified a start in the thawing of frosty relations 
between the PRC and the United States and lead to official diplomatic 
relations between the two countries with the agreements signed during the 
Shanghai Communiqué in February 1972 by U.S. President Richard Nixon 
and China's Chairman Mao Zedong.  Following this, Taiwan witnessed its 
diplomatic relations being severed throughout the 1970s, as most countries 
around the world derecognized it and switched diplomatic relations to 
Beijing.  Taiwan lost its seat in the UN as it was then awarded to China. 
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The U.S. formally severed official diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. 
In March of that year the U.S. closed its embassy in Taipei, however it 
still maintained its' economic and other ties to the island through the 
establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT).3
In the 1980s and 1990s , Taiwan went through a major phase of 
democratization.  One of the first steps in this process was the establishment 
of an opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), on 
September 28, 1986.4  Another significant move by the government was the 
termination of martial law on July 15, 1987.5  Lifting martial law allowed the 
people of Taiwan to enjoy new freedoms of speech, assembly, and publishing, 
among others.  With the sudden death of President Chiang Ching-kuo, 
Lee Teng-hui became the first president of the ROC who was actually 
born in Taiwan.  Under Lee, Taiwan's political democratization moved 
further still when direct elections for president and vice president were 
held for the first time on March 23, 1996.  This induced a quick response 
by the PRC.  It initiated missile exercises close to Taiwan in an attempt to 
intimidate the people of the island not to move towards a formal declaration 
of independence.  The U.S. responded to the PRC's military exercises by 
sending the largest naval force to be deployed in Asia since the Vietnam 
War.  Fortunately, this crisis ended without incident.
Further acting as a wedge between the two sides on the Taiwan Straits, 
at least as far as Beijing is concerned, was the enactment of the Taiwan 
Security Enhancement Act on February 2, 1999 by the U.S. House of 
Representatives.  This legislation provides guidelines for increased contact 
and training between Taiwanese and U.S. forces.  Obviously, this move only 
further agitated China.  As one response to this bill, China released a White 
Paper on cross-strait relations and warned Taiwan that declaring de jure 
independence or continuing to delay reunification would cause China to take 
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action against the island in what the PRC states as “drastic measures.”
Cross-strait relations hit another low point when President Lee said that 
China and Taiwan should handle relations with one another on a "state-to-
state" basis during an interview with the German radio station Deutsche 
Welle in July 1999.  This was met with harsh reactions by the authorities 
in Beijing.  Perhaps one of the most significant events to take place in the 
political history of Taiwan was when the Democratic Progressive Party lead 
by incumbent Chen Shui-bian replaced the Nationalist Party on December 
1, 2001.6  The Nationalist Party had been the ruling party of government 
since it arrived in Taiwan in 1949.  This was a peaceful transition of power 
by popular vote.  This extension of Taiwan's democracy was a real concern 
to Beijing, as it would most likely be the major obstacle for reunification 
with China.  At least until significant reforms change the social, economic 
and political structure of China, enticing the people in Taiwan to rejoin the 
Mainland will most likely prove to be difficult.
Taiwan's Foreign Relations
Taiwan's relations with most countries around the world are unique in 
the sense that it is not a member of the United Nations and is thus a non-
recognized state by most countries in the international community.  Since 
October 1912, the ROC has been an independent state which has never 
been under the control of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which was 
not founded until after the Chinese Civil War on the Mainland in October 
1949.  Further, the ROC has its own flag, national anthem, and military. 
Nevertheless, Taiwan's primary concern centers on relations with Mainland 
China.  Taiwan feels that China is constantly working at obstructing it from 
participating on the international stage.  China does this by threatening 
to cut or downgrade relations with any nation that engages Taiwan in an 
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official capacity.  The PRC considers Taiwan to be a "renegade province" and 
has made many attempts to obstruct what Taiwan feels is its rightful place 
in international organizations.  The Mainland authorities want the people of 
Taiwan to accept and come under their rule.  While many Taiwanese also 
hope to one day reunite with the Mainland, for the time being the majority 
of Taiwanese seem content with the status quo.
Despite the PRC's efforts to exclude it from international bodies, Taiwan 
does have membership in such organizations as the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC), the 
Asian Productivity Organization (APO), the Afro-Asian Rural Reconstruction 
Organization (AARRO), and the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration (CABEI).  In total, Taiwan currently holds membership in 
approximately 972 international non-governmental organizations in various 
fields such as science and technology, medicine, business, finance, 
economics, education, and other types of organizations. 7  The ROC was one 
of the many member nations which signed the UN Charter on June 26, 1945 
in San Francisco.  For over 20 years after the Charter was signed, the ROC 
was a permanent member of the Security Council.  During this time the 
United Nations tried to resolve the dispute as to which side of the Taiwan 
Straits would get a seat for China.  Finally, with the passing of Resolution 
2758 on October 25, 1971 by the United Nations General Assembly, the seat 
was awarded to the People's Republic of China.  Despite no longer having 
a seat at the UN, however, the ROC still maintains friendly relations with 
over 150 countries today. 8  
Since 1993, Taiwan has tried to gather support to participate in the UN.  At 
the 53rd session of the UN General Assembly, twenty-five nations voiced 
their support for the ROC to rejoin the UN.  Unfortunately for Taiwan, its 
bid did not receive approval.  As well, its plan to join the World Health 
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Organization (WHO) in 1997 was turned down.  On the other hand, where 
the ROC does enjoy international status is in economic organizations. 
Despite losing its membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) after the end of the Chinese Civil War to the PRC, it gained 
observer status in its new form, the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 
January 31, 1995.  On November 11, 2001, Taiwan was finally awarded 
membership into the WTO.  This was just one day after the PRC joined 
the organization.  The ROC is also a member of the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (PECC), the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), 
and is a full and active member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) organization as "Chinese Taipei."  Taiwan has also made a significant 
contribution to the international community in the form of humanitarian aid. 
It was quick to respond to the Central American countries after they were 
hit by Hurricane Mitch in October 1998 by giving over U.S. $50 million in 
cash and supplies to Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. 9
The Republic of China on Taiwan currently has official diplomatic relations 
with 22 countries.  However, none of these nations are major powers and 
most receive considerable economic incentives from Taiwan to maintain 
relations.  With many other nations, including many OECD countries, 
Taiwan has 93 representative offices using the name "Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Office" or "Taipei Representative Office" which act as de facto 
embassies in lieu of having official diplomatic relations.  The ROC enjoys 
vibrant trade relations with such nations as Australia, Japan, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, The Philippines and the U.S. to name a few.  Taiwan’s total 
trade value saw an increase by 2.15 percent year-on-year to U.S. $587.72 
billion in 2014.  Exports experienced an increase of 2.70 percent U.S. to 
$313.70 billion, and imports increased by 1.53 percent to U.S. $274.03 billion. 
Taiwan ended 2014 with a trade surplus of U.S. $39.67 billion providing it 
with foreign exchange reserves of U.S. $418.98 billion, ranked at the fifth 
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largest in the world.  Mainland China was Taiwan’s largest trading partner 
with 39.74 percent of exports going to China and imports from the PRC 
accounting for 18.15 percent.10
The Taiwan Relations Act
The relationship between the United States and the ROC is indeed quite 
intimate.  Being a promoter of democracy and human rights in the world, 
the United States has been a strong supporter of the ROC from early on. 
During the Second World War, the U.S. provided the ROC with much needed 
logistical support.  When the Nationalists were driven off the Mainland to 
Taiwan in 1949, the U.S. continued to be a key supporter in the struggle 
against communism.  U.S. resolve in this struggle can be highlighted by the 
strong-worded speech made by Dean Rusk, former assistant secretary of 
state for Far Eastern affairs on May 18, 1951 at the China Institute in New 
York:
It is not my purpose, in these few moments this evening, to go 
into the specific elements of our own national policy in the present 
situation.  But we can tell our friends in China that the United 
States will not acquiesce in the degradation which is being forced 
upon them.  We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for 
what they pretend to be.  The Peiping regime may be a colonial 
Russian government-a Slavic-Manchukuo on a larger scale.  It is not 
the Government of China.  It does not pass the first test.  It is not 
Chinese.  It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of 
nations.11
In particular, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the 
subsequent involvement of Communist China's armed forces in the fall 
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of that year created much tension between the U.S. and the PRC.  This 
persisted right up until the Shanghai Communiqué in February 1972 
which formed the basis for relations between the two powers.  During this 
meeting, the U.S. recognized that there is only one China and Taiwan is an 
integral part of it.  However, this did not prevent the ROC and the U.S. from 
maintaining close ties.  In keeping to conventions stated in the Shanghai 
Communiqué, the U.S. pulled out its remaining forces from Taiwan and 
abrogated the ROC-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.  Nevertheless, the 
U.S. provided [and still provides] Taiwan with military equipment "necessary 
to defend Taiwan," and does not specify dollar amounts that are to be sold 
or limit the types of conventional weapons.  Strategically located in the 
center of East Asia, Taiwan's importance to the U.S. implied that it could 
not leave it without some form of protection or aid.  In place of the former 
Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the ROC, the Taiwan Relations 
Act was promulgated in 1979.  In their book, America and Island China: A 
Documentary History, Stephen P. Gilbert and William M. Carpenter, describe 
the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act as a "unique experiment in 
American diplomatic history" due to the fact this was the first time the U.S. 
had entered into such an agreement with a non-recognized nation and was 
thus an experiment in foreign policy for the U.S..12
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), also known as the Public Law 96-8, which 
was enacted on April 10, 1979, starts with a six-point statement describing 
the U.S.'s chief policy and relations with Taiwan:
1. To preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly 
commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the 
United States and the people on Taiwan.
2. To regard peace and stability in the area as in the political, 
security, and economic interests of the United States, and as 
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matters of international concern.
3. That the establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing rests 
on the expectation that the future of the ROC will be determined 
solely by peaceful means.
4. That any attempt to determine that future by other than peaceful 
means, including use of boycott or embargo, would be regarded 
as a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and a 
matter of grave concern to the United States.
5. To continue to provide defensive arms to the ROC, but without 
consultation with the PRC.
6. To maintain a capacity to resist any form of coercion exerted 
against the security social or economic system of the ROC.13
Would the U.S. come to Taiwan's aid in the event of an emergency in the 
Taiwan Straits despite not having official diplomatic relations with the 
island?  The answer to this question was clearly answered when the U.S. 
dispatched two aircraft carrier groups into the region after China conducted 
live-fire missile exercises dangerously close to Taiwan during its presidential 
elections in March 1996.14 
Since the Truman era, each and every administration in the White House is 
committed to seeing the situation between both sides of the Taiwan Straits 
resolved peacefully.  Nonetheless, in an interview with the Associated 
Press, President Bush stated that using U.S. military might was "certainly 
an option" should the Chinese Mainland launch an attack on Taiwan.15 
Furthermore, at a press conference in Washington D.C. on March 16, 2003, 
U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated: "Our policy is very, 
very clear: We have a 'one China' policy.  We believe that there should be no 
unilateral change of the status quo."  This was in response to whether the U.S. 
would give any concessions to Beijing in support for a U.S. lead campaign 
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against Iraq.  During the conference it was made clear that no changes with 
relations between the U.S. and China or alterations in the TRA would be 
made.16 This does not appear to signify any policy change on Taiwan and is 
in full adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act passed in 1979.
Taiwan's Strategic Significance
The author first went to Taiwan in March 1997, exactly a year after the 
Chinese military conducted missile exercises off Taiwan's coast during its 
first direct election for president and vice president.  News of the missile 
exercises through which the Mainland tried to use to intimidate the 
Taiwanese populace had received international attention and therefore it 
was felt that a visit to the island nation would prove to be an informative 
experience.  Taiwan appeared to be one of East Asia's most dynamic and 
vibrant societies.  Nevertheless, reunifying Taiwan remains the corner stone 
of China's foreign policy.  China fears that if Taiwan were to declare de jure 
independence, then other restless regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang would 
follow suit setting off a chain reaction that could very easily undermine the 
legitimacy of the Beijing authorities.
The first European explorers to discover Taiwan, the Portuguese, referred 
to Taiwan as “Ilha Formosa” or “Beautiful Isle” reflecting the beautiful and 
natural environment which Taiwan is blessed with.  Aside from Taiwan 
being a wealthy jewel in the Chinese world, it also offers a special strategic 
position from a military point of view.  In his book, Kaiyou Kokka Nihon 
no Kousou: Sekai Chitsujou to Chiiki Chitsujou (Maritime Nation Japan's 
Conceptions: The World Order and Regional Order), ltou Kenichi points 
out that because the waters of the East China Sea are too shallow for the 
Chinese Navy's submarines to submerge, they are quickly detected, and thus 
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do not pose a threat.  Submarines that leave port from Shanghai and Tianjin 
cannot quickly submerge for fear of hitting the sea bottom.  However, 
if Taiwan were to become a part of China the situation would change 
dramatically.  To the east of Taiwan is the deepest ocean in the world.17  If 
submarines left port from Taiwan, they could quickly submerge into the 
ocean's depths and would likely be undetected.  This would provide China 
with the first step in having a blue-water navy and thus move beyond just 
being a regional power.  Therefore, militarily, the strategic importance of 
Taiwan cannot he underestimated.
During his term in office, President Lee Teng-hui was instrumental in 
ushering a new era of politics in Taiwan.  He initiated not only many wide-
reaching economic reforms, but was also responsible for the expansion of 
democracy.  In particular, under his administration the National Assembly 
commenced direct elections for mayor of Taiwan's two largest cities, Taipei 
and Kaohsuing, and of course introduced direct election by popular vote for 
president and vice president.  Perhaps what Lee is most famous for is his 
announcement that China and Taiwan are involved in a "special state-to-
state relationship" when he was interviewed by the German radio station 
Deutsche Welle on July 9, 1999.18  His aim in doing this was to remind the 
world of Taiwan's precarious position in the international community.  This 
was also done in order to clarify the position that Taiwan is a separate 
political entity from Mainland China and to gain sympathy from around the 
world.  His words of course set off a wave of protests from the authorities in 
Beijing.  To add to Lee's statement, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji made a slip 
of the tongue in a speech at the annual National People's Congress in Beijing 
on March 6, 2003 when he referred to Mainland China and Taiwan as "two 
countries."  He immediately attempted to correct himself by saying that they 
were "two sides".19  This may be a reflection of what Taiwan is, a separate 
political entity from the Mainland.  In spite of this, Lee Teng-hui's actions 
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and speech were a catalyst for the democratic and liberalization process 
and enhancing Taiwan's status on the international stage.  Lee played an 
important role in the "Taiwan Experience" whereby the island not only went 
through a remarkable transformation known as the "economic miracle," but 
also a "political miracle" due to its peaceful transition from being a garrison 
state under martial law in the past to the multi-party democratic society that 
it is today.
Article 23: Beijing's Anti-Subversion Law for Hong Kong
Undoubtedly, whatever the future holds for Taiwan, it will not be decided 
without the participation of its people.  Political democratization on the island 
has made it all the more difficult and less appealing for the populace to hand 
over physical control to the authorities on the Chinese Mainland.  The people 
of Taiwan have no incentive to relinquish the popular sovereignty they have 
worked so hard to attain.  News about the new anti-subversion law that 
was to come into effect in Hong Kong in mid-2003 can only cause alarm to 
the people in Taiwan.  Before Hong Kong was handed over to China, there 
was a stipulation that the laws that govern the former British colony would 
remain intact for 50 years after the handover.  This is arguably an attempt 
to circumvent this explicit promise; the law is vaguely worded enough to 
be open to interpretation on what amounts to “subversion” and moreover 
gives the PRC authorities the power to imprison dissidents for life.  In an 
interview with The Asian Wall Street Journal in mid-February, 2003, Mak 
Yin-ting, chairwoman of the Hong Kong Journalist’s Association said this 
about the anti-subversion bill: “It'll still be considered an offense to publish, 
sell, distribute, display, print, import and export seditious publications.  If 
this is the case, how can media work freely?  If you give some publication 
to your friends, it may be a crime.”20  The Hong Kong authorities claimed 
that this legislation was targeted at terrorists or groups that will try to 
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undermine the Chinese authorities.  However, it did appear to be a step in 
limiting freedom of speech and expression in Hong Kong just six years after 
its handover to China.  Therefore, it would seem that the Taiwanese may 
not be interested in the "Hong-Kongizing" of Taiwan.
The future of Taiwan will also be dependent on one major geopolitical 
factor, U.S.-China relations.  So long as the disputes between both sides of 
the Straits are resolved peacefully, the United States will keep a distance 
from becoming involved in China-Taiwan affairs.  There are three possible 
future scenarios facing Taiwan according to Andrew J. Nathan. The first 
possibility is that there is heightened tension between the two sides of 
the Taiwan Straits.  This could come about by Taiwan acquiring nuclear 
weapons, if there was a coup or social unrest, if the independence forces 
took control of Taiwanese politics, or if the Mainland sought to blockade 
Taiwan or seriously threatened the island or outright attacked it.  Hopefully, 
none of these scenarios will occur.  Another possibility is that the two sides 
come to some sort of agreement where Taiwan's de facto independence 
would become de jure whereby Taiwan proclaims that there is only one 
China, but Taiwan promises to never to come under the influence of a 
foreign power whether it be friendly or hostile to the Mainland.  In this case, 
China would renounce the use of force against the island as a way to solve 
disputes.  This option, however, would never please the Mainland as de jure 
independence of Taiwan would never be acceptable.  The third scenario is 
maintaining the status quo of Taiwan.21  This seems to remain the case as 
the Mainland authorities refuse to renounce the use of force, and at every 
turn attempt to cramp Taiwan's living space in the international community. 
Taiwan does, however, continue to enjoy economic and cultural relations 
with many nations in the world and most people on the island are content 
to live the way they do.  At the same time, they are able to travel far more 
freely than their Mainland counterparts.  As well, this seems to be the most 
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feasible situation as a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan would 
surely give the People's Republic a casus belli to invade Taiwan even after 
considering the kind of negative international response it may face, let alone 
the possibility of some form of direct or indirect military intervention by the 
United States.
Cross-Strait Relations
The relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China is a delicate one. 
Peace between the two sides is imperative for the peace and stability of 
the Asia-Pacific Region in particular and for the world as a whole.  The 
Republic of China, established in 1912 after the fall of the Qing Dynasty, 
was the sole ruling government over the Chinese nation until it was driven 
off the Mainland to Taiwan in 1949.  The Chinese Civil War which started 
in 1927 still has not been completely resolved to this day.  A comparison 
could be made with the divided Korean Peninsula.  However, both North 
and South Korea enjoy official diplomatic relations with many nations in the 
world and both nations have memberships in the UN and other international 
organizations.  The same cannot be said for Taiwan, which feels isolated in 
the international community.
The ROC and the PRC both have different economic, social, and political 
systems which have evolved over the past 80 some years.  Hostilities 
between the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan continued long after the 
Nationalists moved to Taiwan.  The People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
launched a series of provocations against Taiwan in the 1950s, culminating in 
the heavy artillery bombardment of Kinmen (Quemoy) in 1958 in which tens 
of thousands of shells hit the island.  When the PRC established diplomatic 
relations with the United States in 1979, it changed its approach to Taiwan 
to a "peaceful reunification strategy" replacing its former policy of "liberating" 
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Taiwan.22
Although the ROC has renounced the use of force against the Chinese 
Mainland with the termination of the Period of National Mobilization for the 
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion announced by President Lee Teng-
hui on May 1, 1991, the PRC has not returned in kind.  In spite of this fact, 
since Taiwan ended martial law in July 1987, people-to-people exchanges 
across the Straits have been flourishing and two-way trade has expanded 
significantly.  In 1999, cross-strait trade amounted to U.S. $25.84 billion, up 
from the U.S. $23.97 billion in 1998.  Approximately 1.85 million Taiwanese 
visited the Mainland, and 106,699 people from China went to Taiwan in 1999. 
This was an 11.98% and 17.74% respective increase from the year before. 
In addition, Taiwanese businesses invested a total of U.S. $1.25 billion in the 
Mainland in 1999.23  Economic ties have expanded exponentially since then. 
From the period January-September 2015 Mainland-Taiwan trade amounted 
to U.S. $137.71 billion, with the Mainland exporting U.S. $33.55 billion to 
Taiwan and China importing from Taiwan a total of U.S. $104.16 billion.24 
Figure 1 shows the rapid growth in recent China-Taiwan trade since 1990.
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Figure 1
Organizations which Conduct Affairs across the Taiwan Straits
There are currently three organizational structures which handle affairs 
with the Chinese Mainland.  In September 1990, the National Unification 
Council (NUC) was established as an organization to discuss matters 
pertaining to the possibility of reunification with the Mainland.  This body is 
lead by the President of the ROC.  In January 1991, Taiwan established the 
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) to handle issues regarding formulating and 
implementing policy towards the Mainland.  It is headed by a chairman and 
three vice chairmen.  The third organization, which was formed in February 
1991, is the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF).  It too has a chairman 
at its head, however as a private organization authorized by the ROC 
government, it cannot deal with China in an official capacity and mostly 
Source: Taiwan Bureau of Foreign Trade
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handles business matters between the two sides.25  The existence of these 
three organizations is a reflection of the fact that for Taiwan, it is important 
to maintain a stable and peaceful relationship with its neighbor across the 
Taiwan Straits in Mainland China.  The leader of the MAC met with his 
Chinese counterpart to discuss issues and confidence building measures in 
the so-called Koo-Wang Talks in Singapore in 1993 for the first time.26  The 
PRC deals with Taiwan through its Association for Relations Across the 
Taiwan Straits (ARATS), founded on December 16, 1991.  Sharing a similar 
cultural and historical background, both sides of the Straits are bound in a 
close relationship which Taiwan cannot ignore.
Source of Contention for the PRC: New Passport for Taiwan and 
New Constitution
In the past decade under the Chen administration, one development in 
Taiwan saw the populace being issued with new passports with the word 
'Taiwan' written on the cover commencing in September 2003.  This, of 
course did not please China.  The Foreign Ministry of China spokesman, 
Kong Quan, warned Taiwan of its "Gradual independence" ploy, stating 
that, "Such an interpretation is unacceptable."27  Chinese government 
officials were quick to react to this issuing of new passports as a violation of 
the "one-China" principle.  Going a step much further, was the proposition 
to the Taiwanese people by President Chen Shui-bian to vote for a new 
constitution.  He signaled the 17th anniversary of the Democratic Progressive 
Party by announcing to create "together with Taiwan's 23 million people 
the birth of a new Taiwan Constitution" by 2006.28 This step, once taken, 
would allow for referendums to be called on anything from Taiwan's name 
to outright independence.  These moves caused a low point in China-Taiwan 
relations during the mid-2000s.  Once again, it was called into question 
whether Taiwan’s future remains with the Qing Tian Bai Ri or if it will be 
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reunified with Mainland China under the Wu Xing Hong Qi.29
Improved Relations Since 2008
With the March 22, 2008 presidential victory achieved by the KMT party, 
relations have improved substantially.  On April 12, 2008, Hu Jintao held a 
meeting with the ROC’s then vice-president elect Vincent Siew as chairman 
of the Cross-Straits Common Market Foundation during the Boao Forum 
for Asia.  Hu met with KMT chairman, Wu Po-hsiung, on May 2008.  This 
was the first meeting between the heads of the CCP and the KMT as ruling 
parties since 1949.  They agreed to recognize the dialogue established 
under the 1992 consensus.  Wu was committal on the KMT being against 
“Taiwanese independence” and stressed the fact that a “Taiwanese identity” 
did not mean “Taiwanese independence.”30  Ma Ying-jeou has been an 
advocate of improving cross-strait relations and has made the appeal that 
relations between China and Taiwan should refocus from “mutual non-
recognition” to “mutual non-denial.”31  His stance has not since changed.  This 
has been a major source of the easing of tensions between the two sides.
Establishment of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA)
One major stride was made in improving cross-strait relations with the 
establishment of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) 
on June 29, 2010.  Upon becoming Taiwan’s president, Ma Ying-jeou has 
pledged a Mainland policy based on “no-independence, no unification, 
and no use of force.”32  Ma took steps to reverse the militant policies of 
former Presidents Lee Tung-hui and Chen Shui-bian.  The KMT president 
promised to reengage with China under the concept of “one China, different 
interpretations,” also known as the above mentioned “1992 consensus.” 
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Indeed, cross-strait tensions have subsided.  In response to Taipei’s 
conciliatory actions, President Hu Jintao also coined a 16-character guideline 
to welcome this positive development.  He stated that both Beijing and 
Taipei should “build mutual trust, lay aside differences, seek consensus while 
shelving differences, and create a win-win situation.”33
The authorities in Beijing responded in kind and eased its longstanding 
policy of isolating Taiwan from the international community.  Since May 
2009, Beijing went as far as allowing Taiwan to participate as an observer, 
in the annual World Health Assembly, the executive arm of the World 
Health Organization (WHO).  As of October 2011, Taiwan joined 7 other 
international organizations as either a full member or an observer and 2 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).34  China also agreed to Ma’s “mutual 
non-denial” formulation, meaning that each side does not repudiate the 
jurisdiction of the other.35  Both sides of the Taiwan Strait had achieved a 
tacit diplomatic truce in order so that each side would stop the efforts to win 
diplomatic recognition from countries at the expense of the other.36  Since 
Ma Ying-jeou became president, only one state that had formal diplomatic 
ties with Taipei defected to Beijing.  As a matter of fact, China even went 
as far as rejecting requests from Panama and Paraguay to establish official 
diplomatic relations in a rare moment of good will between the two sides of 
the Taiwan Strait.37
Against the Backdrop of Easing Tensions: China’s Military Buildup
Although tensions have eased between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, 
China has continued its military buildup unabated.  China has not renounced 
the use of force to reunify Taiwan with the Chinese Motherland.38  President 
Ma Ying-jeou has called on Beijing to reduce its military forces focused on 
Taiwan.39  The PLA has 1200+ short and medium range ballistic missiles 
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targeting Taiwan.   This highlights the need for Taiwan to maintain a certain 
level of defense procurement for its own security.  Figure 2 illustrates how 
the military imbalance is vastly in China’s favor.  
Figure 2
On Transportation Links: Direct Flights Established
The following section is based heavily upon Cheng (2003).40  There was a 
small, but significant breakthrough in cross-strait relations in January 2003, 
when a Boeing 747-400 from Taiwan's China Airlines flew to Shanghai from 
Taipei on January 26, 2003.  The flight still had to travel via Hong Kong. 
However, the passengers were spared the headache of disembarking there. 
The flight was 90 minutes from Taipei to Hong Kong, then another two 
and a half hours to Shanghai.  Usually the change in Hong Kong requires a 
Source: U.S. Department of Defense 
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wait in what can sometimes be long visa line-ups that can take an hour or 
even longer.  This flight was the first of its kind, without visa line-ups, in 54 
years.  Even without deplaning in Hong Kong, the trip takes a considerable 
amount of time.  A direct flight from Taipei to Shanghai would only take one 
hour.  This would cut close to three hours in travel time, not to mention the 
savings that would accrue to businesses.
Direct transportation, trade and communication links between the Chinese 
Mainland and Taiwan were severed in 1949 after the civil war between 
Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists and the Communists lead by Mao Zedong. 
This was mainly due to the fact that Taiwan feared for its security and is 
the major reason why the ban was put in place.  The major concern if direct 
transportation links were initiated is that the PLA's Air Force could use the 
links to start an attack against the island.  It only takes seven minutes for a 
Chinese fighter jet to reach Taiwanese airspace, and if there were regular 
flights between the Mainland and Taiwan, then the first area of defense 
could more easily be infiltrated.41 
Philip Yang, a political scientist from National Taiwan University said, 
"This is not a government-to-government or military-to-military issue.  This 
is people-to-people, economy-to-economy."42  Taiwanese businesses have 
invested more than U.S. $66.8 billion in China according to the Central Bank 
of Taiwan.  Thirty percent of Taiwan's exports went to China in December 
2002.  This was greater than exports that went to the U.S., making China 
Taiwan's largest market for the first time.43  Finally, by July 2008, regularly 
scheduled direct flights between China and Taiwan were started.  This 
could not have come at a better time when considering that the number of 
Taiwanese living on the Mainland doing business and studying is estimated 
to be as many as 1,000,000 people.44  Direct flights have further increased 
cross-strait economic and cultural exchange.  By 2010, the PRC sent 1.63 
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million tourists to Taiwan, more than any other country, overtaking Japan to 
claim the top spot for the first time.  This figure rose to 1.78 million in 2011 
and 2.59 million in 2012 when Taiwan decided to admit individual tourists 
from China.45 
January 2016 Election in Taiwan: Implications for Cross-Strait 
Relations
On January 16, 2016, the voters of Taiwan elected the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) leader, Tsai Ing-wen, in a landslide victory in both 
the legislative and presidential elections.  This is the first time the DPP had 
secured full governing power as the ruling party since it was established 
in 1986.  The election victory was a result of the Taiwanese people’s 
dissatisfaction with slow GDP and wage growth.  Also called into question 
was Taiwan’s over-reliance on trade with China, where 40% of the islands 
exports, consisting of 70% of GDP, are sent.46  The new administration is 
focused on diversifying sources of economic growth by seeking a wider 
array of trade and investment partners.  Part of this goal may be reached 
if Taiwan is allowed to participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
trade agreement.  Inclusion in these trade talks will hinge upon Taiwan 
receiving endorsement from TPP members and the maintaining of a 
steady relationship with China.  The policy of the displaced Kuomintang 
(KMT) towards Mainland China had been conciliatory in the fact that it 
recognizes the “1992 consensus,” meaning that both China and Taiwan 
are in agreement that there is only one China.47  Tsai does not accept this 
current political framework for China-Taiwan relations.  How the Taiwanese 
leadership and the authorities in Beijing work towards finding an amicable 
compromise to this situation will be one of the most crucial elements of 
maintaining calm in East Asia. 
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Conclusion
While relations with China are improving, the future of Taiwan, whatever 
it may be, should be arrived at peacefully.  The prospect of the Taiwanese 
populace accepting Beijing's "one country, two systems" concept does 
not bode well considering the anti-subversion law that China attempted 
introducing to Hong Kong.  This blatant violation of the 1984 Sino-British 
Joint Declaration on Hong Kong which promised to leave the territory's 
social, economic, and political system intact for 50 years is alarming for 
the people of Hong Kong.  Moreover, the people of Taiwan do not like the 
prospects that are in store for them if they were to come under the physical 
control of China.  However, the fact remains that if Taiwan were to declare 
de jure independence, the possibility of Beijing taking military action is 
highly likely.  The implications of this would be felt far beyond the realm of 
East Asia.  What actions other nations would take may not be clear, but for 
certain the international reaction to China crossing the Straits of Formosa 
would be grave.
Nevertheless, during the past decade, Taiwan, under the leadership of 
President Ma Ying-jeou, has vastly improved relations with China.  Trade, 
investment and people-to-people exchange have all been significantly 
expanded.  The political elites on both sides of the Taiwan Straits at the 
present time agree to a situation of peace and mutual exchange.  Hopefully, 
this new trend will continue now and into the future regardless of the party 
in power in either Taiwan or China.
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